Electronically Filed

8/23/2019 4:28 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff—Respondent,

)
)

v.

N0. 46524-2018

)

Jerome County Case N0.
CR27-18-655

)

JOSHUA D. DEWITT,

)
)

Defendant—Appellant.

)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF JEROME

HONORABLE JOHN K. BUTLER
District

Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

KIMBERLY A. COSTER

Attorney General
State of Idaho

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

PAUL R. PANTHER

322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712

Deputy Attorney General

E-mail: d0cuments@sapd.state.id.us

Chief, Criminal

Law Division

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal

Law Division

O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
P.

E-mail: ecf@a2.idaho.2ov

ATTORNEYS FOR

ATTORNEY FOR

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

.......................................................................................................... ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case .............................................................................................................. 1

Statement
IS SUE

........................................................................................................ 1

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings ................................................... 1

..............................................................................................................................................

ARGUMENT

...................................................................................................................................

7

8

Shown That The District Court Erred By
Denying His Motion T0 Suppress ........................................................................................ 8
Dewitt Has Not

A.

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 8

B.

Standard

C.

The Detention Of Dewitt And Search Of His Vehicle
Were Reasonable Under The Fourth Amendment ................................................... 9
1.

Of Review ................................................................................................. 9

Trooper Marrott’s Questions Regarding Dewitt’s
Travel Plans Did Not Unlawfully Extend The

Duration

2.

Of The Trafﬁc

Stop ........................................................................ 11

Trooper Marrott’s Questions Regarding Drugs

Did Not Improperly Extend The Trafﬁc Stop ............................................... 13
3.

The

District

Court Correctly Concluded That

Deploying The Drug
4.

The

Stop .................................... 15

Trooper Marrott Had Reasonable Suspicion T0 Extend

The Trafﬁc Stop
D.

Dog Did Not Extend The

In Order

T0 Deploy A Drug Dog

District Court’s Determination

......................................

20

That Dewitt Did Not

Unequivocally Invoke His Right T0 Counsel

Is

Supported

By The Record ....................................................................................................... 27

CONCLUSION

..............................................................................................................................

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

......................................................................................................

30
30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

M
Arizona

V.

w

Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) ..................................................................................... 14

California V. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)

................................................................................

11

United States, 5 12 U.S. 452 (1994)

................................................................................

27

Davis

V.

Delaware

V.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ..................................................................................... 10

Florida V. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) ........................................................................................ 12
Florida V. Roger, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) .......................................................................................... 10

Katz

United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) .................................................................................. 10

V.

Michigan

Miranda

Ray V.

V.

V.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

State,

Rodriguez

Smith

Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) ...................................................................................... 27

V.

State V.

V.

....................................................................................

432 P.3d 872 (Wyo. 2018) ....................................................................................... 12
United States, 575 U.S.

Gordy, 2015

_, 135 S. Ct.

10, 13, 15

....................................................

26

Adan, 886 N.W.2d 841 (N.D. 2016) ................................................................................ 26

302 P.3d 328 (2012)

State V.

Brumﬁeld, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P.3d 706

State V.

Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 283 P.3d 722 (2012)

State V. Davis, 162 Idaho 874,

406 P.3d 886

(Ct.

(Ct.

........................................................

11, 16

App. 2001) ................................................. 25
.....................................................

20, 21, 23

App. 2017) ...................................................... 27

Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 50 P.3d 1014 (2002) ....................................................................... 29

State V. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 37 P.3d

State V. Franzen,

State V.

1609 (2015) ..................................

WL 5178817 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2015)

State V. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703,

State V.

27

625

(Ct.

App. 2001) ........................................................... 29

792 N.W.2d 533 (ND. 2010) ............................................................................ 26

Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128

(Ct.

ii

App. 2008) .............................

12, 21, 22,

26

362 P.3d 551

State V. Hays, 159 Idaho 476,

State V. Howell, 159 Idaho 245,

App. 2015) ....................................................... 12

(Ct.

358 P.3d 806

App. 2015)

(Ct.

1280

State V. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761,

State V.

379 P.3d 351

Law, 136 Idaho 721, 39 P.3d 661

State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605,

State V.

McGraw, 163 Idaho

State V.

Munoz, 149 Idaho

App. 2016)

....................................................

21

389 P.3d 150 (2016) ...............................................................

13, 15

736, 418 P.3d 1245 (Ct. App. 2018) ......................................... 13, 15

State V. Myers, 118 Idaho 608,

798 P.2d 453

367 P.3d 1231

......................................................................

9

(Ct.

App. 1990) ..................................................... 10

(Ct.

App. 2016)

State V. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 17 P.3d 301 (Ct.

State V.

24

App. 2002) .......................................................... 27

(Ct.

121, 233 P.3d 52 (2010)

State V. Neal, 159 Idaho 919,

..................................................

App. 2015)

(Ct.

(Ct.

17

App. 2002) .................................................. 22

State V. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 51 P.3d 1112 (Ct.

State V. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 361 P.3d

...................................................

.....................................................

22

App. 2000) ................................................. 12

Page, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008) .................................................................... 29

State V. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 179 P.3d

346

(Ct.

App. 2008)

State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 187 P.3d 1261 (Ct.

State V. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545,

415 P.3d 954

(Ct.

State V. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 371 P.3d 3 16 (2016)

State V. Roe, 140 Idaho 176,

90 P.3d 926

State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 88 P.3d

State V. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841,

(Ct.

App. 2008)

App. 2018)

..........................................

29
12

passim
12

App. 2004) ........................................................... 10

1220

478

...............................................

......................................................................

(Ct.

App. 2003) .................................................. 10

979 P.2d 1199 (1999)

State V. Whipgle, 134 Idaho 498, 5 P.3d

......................................................

(Ct.

................................................................

App. 2000)

.....................................................

11

27

State V. Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 211 P.3d 91 (2009) ............................................................... 9

State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d

966 (1996)

iii

....................................................................

8

Telly

V.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

1

(1968)

9,

10

..............................................................

25

..............................................................................................

Arango, 912 F.2d 441 (10th

United States

V.

United States

V. Barns,

United States

V. Contreras,

United States

V.

Foreman, 369 F.3d 776 (4th

United States

V.

Goss, 256 F. App’x 122 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................. 26

United States

V.

Lawson, 731

United States

V.

Mason, 628 F.3d 123 (4th

United States

V. Shareef,

United States

V. Terry,

Wenzel

V. Early,

2006

Wenzel

V. Early,

226

858 F.3d 937 (5th

Cir.

2017) ............................................................. 25, 26

506 F.3d 1031 (10th

F.

App’X 663

Cir.

Cir.

2007)

Cir.

........................................................

........................................................

25

2010)

.................................................................

25

Cir.

1996) ............................................................ 15

WL 2176330 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2019)

..........................................

12

.....................................................

29

......................................................................

30

WL 8439845 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2006)

F.

App'x 739 (9th

Cir.

24

2004) .............................................................. 26

(9th Cir. 2018)

100 F.3d 1491 (10th

2019

1990)

Cir.

2007)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. IV

....................................................................................................................

iv

9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Joshua D. Dewitt appeals from his judgment 0f conviction for trafﬁcking in marijuana,

entered 0n his conditional guilty plea.

motion

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The

Trooper Michael Marrott

On

12-201)

—

is

Proceedings

a canine handler With the Idaho State Police. (7/16/18 T11, p.

January 31, 2018, he was on 1-84

Joshua A. Dewitt make two
L. 18

appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial 0f his

to suppress.

Statement

7, Ls.

On

p. 15, L. 14.)

He

Jerome, Idaho. (7/16/18

illegal lane

When he observed

a vehicle driven by

changes and initiated a trafﬁc stop. (7/16/18

ﬁrst observed Dewitt’s vehicle headed eastbound While

you coming from today?”; “Where

are

you headed?”; “Where

long were you out here?” (EX. A, 11:32:18
sorts

—

still

After explaining the reason for the stop

Tr., p. 16, Ls. 12-25.)

A, 11:31:43 — 11:32:12), he asked Dewitt several simple questions regarding his
are

Tr., p. 14,

11:33:01).

is

home

travel:

for you?”;

west of

(1d,;

EX.

“Where

and

“How

According t0 Trooper Marrott, these

of questions are “[t]ypical questions asked of everybody on every trafﬁc stop.”

(5/29/18

T11, p. 8, Ls. 9-14.)

Dewitt’s response, though, was suspicious t0 Trooper Marrott for several reasons.

(5/29/18 Tr., p.

1

8, L.

The hearing on

9

— p.

10, L. 15.) First,

Dewitt could not clearly identify from where he was

the motion to suppress that

is

the subject of this appeal

2018, and the transcript of that hearing Will be referred to as ‘7/16/18 Tr.’
district court

was held on July
At that hearing,

16,

the

took judicial notice of the transcript from the preliminary hearing, and admitted the

dash-cam Video from the trafﬁc stop that underlies the motion t0 suppress as an exhibit. (7/ 16/ 1 8
T11, p. 5, L. 20 — p. 6, L. 19.) The former will be referred t0 as ‘5/29/18 Tr.’, and the latter as
‘EX. A’. EX. A is in the record on appeal as ‘Marrott_20180134.mp4’.

coming, “stumbl[ing] between Twin Plains or Twin

Falls.

He

couldn’t really remember.” (Id.)

That was so despite the fact that he claimed t0 have driven there from
Visit his brother,

Who had

Trooper Dewitt thought

0f the

city.

(Id.)

it

recently had a

odd

that,

new

Illinois,

where he

lived, to

baby, and had stayed a “couple 0f days.”

under those circumstances, Dewitt would not

know

the

(Id.)

name

Second, Dewitt was “extremely nervous,” taking 15 t0 20 seconds before

attempting t0 answer the question Where he was coming from, while he tilted his head back,
closed his eyes, and took deep, calming breaths.

(Id.)

Trooper Dewitt thought

this

was “over

top nervousness” unlike what he encounters in a normal trafﬁc stop, 0r even a drug arrest.

Third, though Dewitt

was

was apparently saying

that

he was coming from Twin

inconsistent With the fact that Trooper Marrott

(Id.)

response

had ﬁrst observed Dewitt’s vehicle west 0f

Jerome, Idaho, and so well west 0f Twin Falls, headed eastbound. (7/16/18

While Dewitt was searching

Falls, the

the

for his license, registration,

Tr., p. 16, Ls. 3-10.)

and proof of insurance, Trooper

Marrott asked additional questions, including about the presence 0f any weapons 0r drugs in the
vehicle.

11:33:01

(EX. A,

—

11:34:01.)

He

asked individually whether Dewitt had any

methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, or prescription

pills in the vehicle.

(Id.)

When

asked about methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin, Dewitt gave a “distinct ‘No’ for each 0f
those,” but

when asked about

Marrott] and gave a

much

marijuana, he “kind 0f turned his head, looked

quieter denial of that.”

Whether there were prescription
p.

19, Ls.

15-22; EX. A,

pills in the vehicle,

11:33:42

—

11:34:02.)

away from [Trooper

(5/29/18 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 7-14.)

When

asked

Dewitt stated that there were. (7/16/18 TL,

Trooper Marrott then asked

if

they were

prescribed t0 him, at Which point Dewitt brieﬂy stopped searching for his registration and handed

a bottle of prescription amphetamine pills t0 Trooper Marrott.

(Id.)

Finally,

Trooper Marrott

asked

how

long the drive from Pekin,

Dewitt responded 28 hours. (7/16/18

Illinois,

Dewitt’s home, to

Tr., p. 18, Ls. 12-24;

Twin

EX. A, 11:35:23

Falls

—

had taken, and

11:35:30.)

Dewitt could not locate an unexpired registration card, so Trooper Marrott asked Dewitt
t0 continue looking While

11:35:59

—

11:36:40.)

and for warrants.
his

computer

He

(Id.)

he returned t0 his patrol car with Dewitt’s other information. (EX. A,
then immediately called dispatch for a check 0f Dewitt’s driving status

While waiting

for the information

to verify that the drive time

from Pekin,

from dispatch, Trooper Marrott used

Illinois, to

Twin

Falls is

22 hours, not the

28 hours reported by Dewitt. (EX. A, 11:38:21 — 11:39:22.)
Trooper Marrott determined

at that

time that he had reasonable suspicion that Dewitt was

transporting narcotics and recited various factors that he believed contributed to that suspicion.

(EX. A, 11:40:00

—

11:48:09.2)

In addition to Dewitt’s “over the top nervousness,” inability to

provide simple and coherent answers to questions regarding his travel, and change in demeanor

When asked about
him

t0 suspect

marijuana, Trooper Marrott

drug

activity, including:

made

a can 0f

a

number of other observations

“Ozium

spray,

which

is

that caused

a very powerful air

freshener” associated, in Trooper Marrott’s experience, “With attempting to conceal the odor of

narcotics, speciﬁcally marijuana”; the fact that there

was a

single

key

in the ignition,

“typical with drug trafﬁcking, because that vehicle has only one purpose”; multiple

Which

is

empty energy

drink bottles; amphetamines; and a single set of dirty clothes in the back seat with no luggage,

despite having reported a long

2

trip.

(5/29/18 Tr., p.

8, L.

9

— p.

12, L. 22.)

Dewitt claims that Trooper Marrott “told dispatch that based 0n

this

time discrepancy, and his

observations 0f Mr. Dewitt back at the car, he had ‘reasonable suspicion” to believe Mr. Dewitt

was involved

in criminal activity.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

believes he has reasonable suspicion, nothing suggests that he
as
1

opposed

1:48 :09.)

t0 speaking to

Though Dewitt
is

says aloud that he

speaking to dispatch

himself and making a record 0n his dash-cam.

at the

time

(EX. A, 11:40:00

—

Trooper Marrott requested the assistance 0f a second ofﬁcer very early in the stop and,

when

that ofﬁcer arrived,

he brieﬂy discussed the situation with that second ofﬁcer and then

asked Dewitt to step out of his vehicle.

(7/16/18 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 3-23; EX. A, 11:40:40

Which found none. (7/16/18

11:41:50.) Dewitt consented t0 a frisk for weapons,

3-23; Ex. A, 11:41:57

—

Tr., p. 21, Ls.

Trooper Marrott then deployed his drug dog around the

11:42:23.)

—

exterior of the vehicle (EX. A, 11:44:30

narcotics in the trunk (7/16/18 Tr., p. 21, L.

sniff,

—

11:46:15), and the

dog

24 —

Just as he

p. 23, L. 25).

alerted t0 the presence of

was ﬁnishing

the

dog

dispatch returned the information regarding Dewitt that Trooper Marrott had requested ten

minutes

earlier.

(EX. A, 11:45:05

—

11:46:15.)

Trooper Marrott then opened the trunk and found approximately nineteen pounds of
marijuana.

(5/29/18 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 12-23; p. 18, Ls. 10-18; EX. A, 11:47:16

—

11:47:30.)

He

placed Dewitt under arrest and read him his rights, which Dewitt indicated he understood.
(7/16/18 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 9-20; EX. A, 11:47:33

he might be able to help Dewitt
secured the marijuana.

seconds and stated,

if

.

.

.

11:48:00.)

Trooper Marrott then suggested that

he could provide useful information regarding where he had

(EX. A, 11:48:25

“Um

—

Without

—

Dewitt paused for approximately ten

11:49:46.)

my lawyer

.”
.

.

.

(EX. A, 11:49:46

—

11:49:58.)

Trooper

Marrott testiﬁed that he understood this as indicating that “potentially he wanted to not answer
questions Without an attorney, but

want

to say anything without

kind of up in the

air ‘well,

it

wasn’t a strong declaration.

an attorney present.
without

my

I

attorney.”

It

wasn’t him saying,

don’t want to answer questions.’

(7/16/18 Tr., p. 24, L. 21

—

It

‘I

was just

p. 25, L. 9.)

Trooper Marrott paused in asking any questions, but resumed approximately a minute
including questions about

for

how much

it

would be

how much
sold.

marijuana was in the

car,

how much he had paid

(7/16/18 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 10-24; EX. A, 11:49:58

—

don’t

for

later,

it,

11:50:40.)

and

Dewitt was charged with trafﬁcking in ﬁve pounds 0r more 0f marijuana.
69.3)

that

He ﬁled

a motion to suppress,

making

three arguments.

(R., pp. 87-89.)

(R., pp. 68-

First,

he argued

Trooper Marrott improperly extended the stop by “ask[ing] questions that were not relevant

t0 the stop

and

t0 run the

K-9 around

the vehicle.” (R., p. 102.)

Second, he argued that the dog

sniff did not provide probable cause to search Dewitt’s vehicle because the drug

clearly indicate the presence of narcotics.

(R., pp.

103-04.)

dog did not

Third, he argued that Dewitt

unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, after which Trooper Marrott

improperly resumed questioning.

The

district court rej ected

(R., pp. 104-05.)

each 0f these arguments.

It

found that Trooper Marrott did not

extend the scope 0f the trafﬁc stop because the dog sniff was conducted While he was

still

waiting t0 hear back from dispatch about information he needed to complete a trafﬁc citation and
for Dewitt t0 locate a current registration card (R., pp. 134-38), but,

even

if the trafﬁc stop

was

extended, Trooper Marrott had reasonable suspicion sufﬁcient t0 justify the extension and deploy
his drug

dog

(R., p. 137).

Second, the

district court

concluded that Trooper Marrott’s testimony,

coupled With the Video of the trafﬁc stop, was sufﬁcient to establish that his drug dog reliably
alerted t0 the presence of narcotics,

Which provided probable cause

to search the vehicle.

(R., pp.

138-42.) Finally, the district court found that Dewitt had not unequivocally and unambiguously

invoked his right t0 counsel and so Trooper Marrott was permitted to continue questioning
Dewitt. (R., pp. 142-45.)

3

As

amendment reﬂecting a plea agreement
in Which Dewitt agreed t0 enter a guilty plea in exchange for, among other things, the prosecutor
amending the information t0 charge trafﬁcking in less than ﬁve pounds of marijuana. (8/20/18
Tr., p. 48, L. 7 — p. 49, L. 18.)
discussed further below, the information includes an

Dewitt agreed to enter a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial 0f
his

motion

(8/20/18 Tr., p. 48, L. 7

to suppress.

the prosecutor agreed t0

amend

Dewitt was

later

49, L. 18.) In exchange for the guilty plea,

the information to charge trafﬁcking in over one

marijuana, but less than ﬁve, With a

(Id.)

— p.

recommended sentence of seven

years With

two years ﬁxed.

sentenced t0 a sentence of seven years with one year ﬁxed.

Dewitt timely appealed.

(R., pp. 170-73.)

pound of

(R., p. 163.)

ISSJ
Dewitt

Did the

states the issue

on appeal

district court err

When

it

as:

denied Mr. Dewitt’s motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Dewitt

failed t0

show

that the district court erred

by denying

his suppression

motion?

ARGUMENT
Dewitt Has Not
A.

Shown That The

District

Court Erred

BV Denying His Motion T0

Suppress

Introduction

Dewitt

moved

t0 suppress evidence secured after a

drug dog alerted on his vehicle during

a trafﬁc stop, resulting in the discovery of a large quantity 0f marijuana, and he subsequently

answered questions posed by the arresting ofﬁcer, Trooper Marrott.
that (1) questions

(R., pp. 97-107.)

He

asked by Trooper Marrott during the trafﬁc stop improperly extended

it

argued
(R., pp.

100-03); (2) the dog sniff improperly extended the stop because Trooper Marrott did not have

reasonable suspicion 0f drug activity

(id.); (3)

Trooper Marrott did not have probable cause t0

search his vehicle because the drug dog did not reliably alert to the presence of drugs (R., pp.
103-04); and (4) Dewitt unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his right t0 counsel, after

Which Trooper Marrott improperly resumed questioning Dewitt

On

appeal, Dewitt argues that the district court erred

fourth arguments.

(E generally, Appellant’s brief.)

He

(R., pp. 104-05).

by

rejecting his ﬁrst, second,

does not argue that the

district erred

concluding that the reaction 0f the drug dog provided probable cause t0 search the vehicle.

He

has therefore waived that issue.

as to the issues he does address.

4

and

But neither has he established any error by the

by

(Id.)

district court

Trooper Marrott was entitled t0 ask routine questions regarding

Dewitt’s travel as part of the mission of the stop, and his questions regarding the presence of

drugs or weapons in the vehicle did not extend the stop as they were asked While Dewitt was
searching for documents.

Nor

did the dog sniff extend the stop, as

returned the information Trooper Marrott requested. But, even if

4

E

occurred before dispatch

did extend the stop, Trooper

970 (1996) (“When issues 0n appeal are
or argument, they will not be considered”).

State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,

not supported by propositions of law, authority,

it

it

Marrott had reasonable suspicion 0f drug activity sufﬁcient to justify a dog
did not unequivocally and unambiguously invoke his right t0 counsel.

came

is

t0 say

“Um

unambiguous request

.

.

Without

.

for counsel.

my

lawyer

.

.

.

,”

Which

(7/16/18 TL, p. 24, L. 12

is

—

far

sniff.

Dewitt

Finally,

Instead, the closest

he

from an unequivocal and

p. 25, L. 9;

Ex. A, 11:49:46

—

11:49:58.)

Standard

B.

On

Of Review

review of a ruling 0n a motion t0 suppress, the appellate court “defers t0 the

trial

and “freely reviews the

trial

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact unless the ﬁndings are clearly erroneous,”

court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”

State V. Willoughbv, 147

Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009). “Findings 0f fact are not clearly erroneous
are supported

by

substantial

and competent evidence.

Decisions regarding the credibility of

witnesses, weight to be given to conﬂicting evidence, and factual inferences t0 be

Within the discretion of the

trial

court.”

State V.

if they

Munoz, 149 Idaho

drawn

are also

121, 128, 233 P.3d 52, 59

(2010).

C.

The Detention Of Dewitt And Search Of His Vehicle Were Reasonable Under The Fourth

Amendment
The Fourth Amendment 0f the United

States Constitution provides that “[t]he right 0f the

people t0 be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and

seizures, shall not

be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. While routine trafﬁc stops by police

ofﬁcers implicate the Fourth

seizures, the reasonableness

because a trafﬁc stop

is

Amendment’s

of a trafﬁc stop

more

is

prohibition against unreasonable searches and

analyzed under

Tag V.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

1

(1968),

similar t0 an investigative detention than a custodial arrest.

Delaware

V.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d

“[A]n investigative detention

1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).

is

permissible if

speciﬁc articulable facts Which justify suspicion that the detained person

t0

be engaged in criminal

392 U.S.

activity.”

m,

139 Idaho

at

is,

it is

based upon

has been, or

is

983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing

about

m,

at 21).

An

investigative detention

conducted in a manner that

must not only be justiﬁed

at its

beginning, but must also be

reasonably related in scope and duration t0 the circumstances

is

which justiﬁed the interference

in the ﬁrst place.

State V. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181,

90 P.3d 926, 931

police inquiries in the trafﬁc-stop context

Florida V. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983);

(Ct.

App. 2004). “[T]he tolerable duration of

determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address

is

the trafﬁc Violation that warranted the stop and attend t0 related safety concerns.” Rodriguez V.

United

States,

575 U.S.

_, 135

S. Ct.

1609, 1614 (2015) (internal citation omitted).

Though Ofﬁcers may not prolong

a trafﬁc stop

complete their investigation, “[t]he purpose of a stop
the stop

is

initiated,

criminality different

P.3d

at

that

Which

1224. Routine trafﬁc stops

initially

prompted the

may turn up

ofﬁcer t0 investigate matters unrelated to the

798 P.2d 453, 458
succeeding the stop

(Ct.

App. 1990).

may—and

inquiry and ﬁthher investigation

often

not permanently ﬁxed

0f the detention there

for during the course

from

is

beyond the time reasonably necessary

stop.”

may

m,

at the

moment

evolve suspicion of

139 Idaho

inquiries,

at

984, 88

and events

rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines

of

Li.

Warrantless searches are also “per se unreasonable under the Fourth

subject only to a

.

State V. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613,

“The ofﬁcer’s observations, general

by an ofﬁcer.”

.

suspicious circumstances Which could justify an

initial stop.

do—give

.

t0

Amendment—

few speciﬁcally established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz

10

V.

United

States,

is

389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). One exception

the “automobile exception,”

to the warrant requirement

which allows warrantless searches 0f vehicles when there

is

probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.

m

California V. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); State V. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979

P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999).

and of

itself,

“A

reliable

drug dog’s

alert

0n the

exterior of a vehicle

t0 establish probable cause for a warrantless search

of the

is

sufﬁcient, in

interior.”

State V.

Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012).

Trooper

1.

Marrott’s

Regarding

Questions

Unlawfullv Extend The Duration

Dewitt’s

Of The Trafﬁc

Travel

Plans

Did Not

Stop

Dewitt argues that Trooper Marrott unlawfully extended the trafﬁc stop just
initiated it—after explaining the

registration,

he

purpose 0f the trafﬁc stop but before asking for Dewitt’s license,

and insurance—by spending forty—ﬁve seconds asking about Dewitt’s

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-14.)

after

travel plans.

After explaining the reason for the stop, he asked Dewitt four

simple questions regarding his travel: “Where are you coming from today?”; “Where are you

headed?”; “Where

is

home

for you?”;

and

“How

long were you out here?” (EX. A, 11:32:18

—

11:33:01.) According t0 Trooper Marrott, these sorts 0f questions are “[t]ypical questions asked

0f everybody on every trafﬁc stop.” (5/29/18

ﬁve seconds

was

to ask

Tr., p. 8, Ls. 9-14.)

It

took approximately forty-

them only because Dewitt took an abnormally long time

allegedly Visiting in Idaho.

(7/16/18 Tr., p. 15, L. 21

—

p.

t0 identify the city

16, L. 10; Ex.

he

A, 11:32:18 —

11:32:43 (taking approximately twenty—four seconds to respond to the question where he

was

coming from).)

At any

rate, this

arguments

fails

because questions regarding a driver’s travel plans are

routine inquiries permitted as part of the mission of a trafﬁc stop, not an extension 0f

11

it.

“Typically, a reasonable investigation 0f a trafﬁc stop

and

may include

registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car,

destination and purpose.”

2008).

E

State V.

also State V. Hays,

asking for the driver’s license

and asking the driver about his

Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134
159 Idaho 476, 480, 362 P.3d 551, 555

(Ct.

(Ct.

App.

App. 2015)

(concluding that “case law permits an ofﬁcer t0 routinely ask about a driver’s purpose and
destination”

When

effectuating a trafﬁc stop); State V. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d

301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Typically, a reasonable investigation of a trafﬁc stop

asking for the driver’s license and registration, requesting the driver to

sit

may

include

and

in the patrol car,

asking the driver about his destination and purpose.”); State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 890, 187

P.3d 1261, 1265
trafﬁc stop).

gg, United

(Ct.

App. 2008) (holding

that questions regarding travel plans

were part 0f

This same rule has been adopted in other jurisdictions, both federal and

States V. Terry,

No. 3:18-CR-24, 2019

WL

2176330,

at

state.

*15 (W.D. Pa.

E,

May

20,

2019) (“questions about a driver’s travel plans are ordinary inquiries incident to a trafﬁc stop”)
(collecting federal cases);

Ray

was

inquiry into travel plans

V.

State,

432 P.3d 872, 877 (Wyo. 2018) (holding

in ﬁthherance

of the mission 0f the trafﬁc

stop).

that brief

Trooper Marrott

asked only four questions regarding Dewitt’s travel plans (EX. A, 11:32:18 — 11:33:01), which
questions were not a diversion from the trafﬁc stop.

But even

if this

Court determines that the questions regarding Dewitt’s travel plans did

constitute a very brief diversion

from the purpose 0f the

transformed the encounter into an unjustiﬁed detention.

Amendment

is

reasonableness.

searches and seizures;

it

stop,

it

does not follow that they

“‘The touchstone 0f the Fourth

The Fourth Amendment does not prescribe

merely proscribes those Which are unreasonable.”

Idaho 262, 264, 371 P.3d 316, 318 (2016) (quoting Florida

12

V.

all state-initiated

State V. Rios, 160

Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).

While there

no de minimus exception

is

t0 the rule that a detention

be supported by reasonable

suspicion, the counting of seconds as a “deviation” appears to run afoul 0f the “reasonableness”

standard that

there

is

is

the touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment. The

cases which establish the rule that

“no de minimus” exception involved delays of seven

t0 eight minutes, Rodriggez, 135 S.

and two and half minutes, State

161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150,

Ct. at 1613-1614,

154 (2016), not mere seconds as here.
inimical to the Fourth

V. Linze,

Counting individual seconds during a trafﬁc stop

Amendment’s reasonableness requirement,

is

requires ofﬁcers t0 worry about

every pause and beat, and puts courts in the difﬁcult 0r impossible position ofjudging, for any

stop,

Whether

it

could have been expedited.

E

State V.

McGraw, 163 Idaho

736, 741, 418 P.3d

1245, 1250 (Ct. App. 2018) (“Counting every pause taken While writing a citation as conduct that

unlawfully adds time t0 the stop

requirement and

is

is

inimical t0 the Fourth

contrary t0 United States

Supreme Court precedent”).

correct that Trooper Marrott very brieﬂy deviated

his travel plans,

Amendment’s reasonableness

mere forty-ﬁve seconds, Which period of time was largely
and

that

if

Dewitt

is

from the purpose 0f the stop by asking about

Trooper Marrott diligently pursued the mission of the

answer simple questions,

Even

brief delay

stop,

it

was extended by a

attributable t0 Dewitt’s inability t0

was not unreasonable under

the

Fourth

Amendment.

2.

Trooper Marrott’s Questions Regarding Drugs Did Not Improperly Extend The
Trafﬁc Stop

Dewitt next argues that Trooper Marrott improperly extended the duration 0f the trafﬁc
stop

by asking questions regarding

14-15.)

This argument

is

the presence 0f drugs in the vehicle.

also contrary to controlling law.

unrelated to the justiﬁcation for the trafﬁc stop

.
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.

.

“An

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

ofﬁcer’s inquiries into matters

do not convert the encounter

into

something

other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration 0f

the stop.” Arizona V. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).

E

also State V. Renteria, 163 Idaho

545, 548, 415 P.3d 954, 957 (Ct. App. 2018) (“[G]eneralized questions 0n topics unrelated t0 the
original purpose 0f the stop are permissible so long as the unrelated inquiries

extend the duration of the stop”). Such questions are permissible

While the defendant

stop.

is

E m,

if,

do not measurably

for example, they are asked

searching for documents necessary t0 complete the mission 0f the trafﬁc

163 Idaho at 548, 415 P.3d at 957 (holding that inquiries regarding the

presence of drugs or weapons in the vehicle “did not extend the normal length of the stop

because Renteria was

still

in the process

0f searching for proof of insurance when the ofﬁcer

posed the questions. Accordingly, Trooper Sproat’s questioning did not extend the duration of
the stop in Violation 0f the Fourth

Amendment”).

That

is

precisely

what happened

here.

Trooper Marrott asked questions regarding the presence of weapons in the vehicle While Dewitt

was

retrieving his driver’s license (EX.

A, 11:33:00 — 11:33:14), and he asked questions about

drugs in the vehicle while Dewitt was searching for his registration (EX. A, 11:33:24

—

11:34:01).

Dewitt speciﬁcally identiﬁes one such question as having allegedly improperly extended
the stop.

car,

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)

When

Dewitt stated that he had prescription

pills in the

Trooper Marrott asked whether they were prescribed to him. (EX. A, 11:33:43 — 11:33:55.)

Rather than responding with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’, Dewitt “stopped what he was doing,” retrieved the

pills

from

his glove box,

7/16/18 Tr., p. 28, L. 23

and handed them

—

p. 29, L.

registration is not attributable t0

5.)

to

Trooper Marrott.

(EX. A, 11:33:53

—

11:34:01;

But Dewitt’s abandonment of the search for his

Trooper Marrott for purposes of determining Whether Trooper

Marrott improperly extended the stop, and Dewitt cites n0 case law t0 the contrary.

Trooper

Marrott asked a simple question that Dewitt could have answered with a single word while he

14

He

continued t0 search for his registration.
pills or

suggest in any

way

that

did not instruct Dewitt t0 retrieve the prescription

Dewitt should do

so.

Dewitt cannot transform an otherwise

permissible question into an improper extension 0f the stop

Trooper Marrott neither requested nor suggested.
1501 (10th Cir. 1996) (“When a defendant’s
not complain that the resulting delay

same reason

But, for the

abandonment 0f his search

is

as

own

E

by

unilaterally taking actions that

United States

V. Shareef,

100 F.3d 1491,

conduct contributes to a delay, he 0r she

may

unreasonable.”).

discussed in the last section, even if Dewitt’s brief

for his registration

was

attributable to

Trooper Marrott for purposes of

determining Whether the stop was improperly extended, the extension was under eight seconds
long (EX. A, 11:33:53

3.

The

—

11:34:01) and does not implicate Dewitt’s Fourth

District

Amendment rights.

Court Correctly Concluded That Deploying The Drug

Dog Did Not

Extend The Stop

Amendment

“[T]he Fourth

tolerate[s]

certain unrelated investigations that d[o]

lengthen the roadside detention,” including a dog

sniff,

even

if

not

unsupported by independent

reasonable suspicion. Rodriggez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15. The “critical question” for purposes of
the Fourth

Li. at

1616

Amendment

is

whether “conducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”

(internal quotation

marks and

citations omitted).

A

dog

sniff that occurs before the

purpose 0f a trafﬁc stop has been effectuated does not “add time” t0 the stop so long as the
purpose 0f the stop

McGraw, 163 Idaho

is

at

diligently pursued.

M,

161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154.

E

alﬂ

741, 418 P.3d at 1249-50 (holding that while one ofﬁcer conducted dog

sniff While another ofﬁcer continued t0 process citation while also covering the ﬁrst ofﬁcer, the

dog

sniff did not

“add time”

to the trafﬁc stop).
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The

district court

here correctly concluded that the dog sniff conducted by Trooper

Marrott did not “add time” to the trafﬁc stop because he was

dispatch,

is

and for Dewitt

t0

produce valid registration.”

no indication or accusation

provided

all

was not

(R., p. 138.)

waiting 0n a return from

It

ﬁthher held

that,

diligently pursuing his duties.

of Dewitt’s information that he had obtained so

far

He had

and was waiting for dispatch

to

(footnote omitted».

The record supports

the district court’s conclusion.

When Dewitt was

unable to locate an

unexpired registration, Trooper Marrott instructed Dewitt t0 continue looking and t0

know

if

he found

it.

(EX. A, 11:36:00

—

11:36:39.)

car and immediately initiated a check with dispatch

(Id.)

“There

Furthermore, he was waiting 0n Dewitt to provide valid vehicle registration.”

get back t0 him.

(Id.

that Marrott

“still

sniff.

(Ex. A, 11:46:04

the reaction 0f Trooper Marrott’s drug

(R., pp. 103-04), the district court

with that ﬁnding 0n appeal

—

him

Trooper Marrott then returned to his patrol

on Dewitt’s driving

Dispatch did not return that information until ten minutes

Marrott ﬁnished the dog

let

later,

status

and for warrants.

exactly

when Trooper

Though Dewitt argued below

11:46:14.)

dog did not provide probable cause

that

to search his vehicle

held otherwise (R., pp. 138-42), and Dewitt does not take issue

(E generally, Appellant’s

brief).

Thus, by the time Trooper Marrott

acquired the information from dispatch and was in position to complete the trafﬁc stop, he had

probable cause t0

initiate a

Anderson, 154 Idaho
vehicle

is

at

new

seizure for drug activity and t0 search Dewitt’s vehicle.

E

706, 302 P.3d at 331 (“A reliable drug dog’s alert 0n the exterior 0f a

sufﬁcient, in and 0f

itself,

to establish probable cause for a warrantless search

of the

interior.”).

This case

App. 2018).

is

therefore relevantly like State V. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545,

There, the ofﬁcer

who

initiated a trafﬁc stop,

16

415 P.3d 954

(Ct.

Trooper Sproat, suspected drug

activity

and called for the assistance 0f a canine ofﬁcer while returning

547, 415 P.3d at 956.

and for warrants.

Li.

to his patrol car.

Li. at

Trooper Sproat then contacted dispatch for a check of the driver’s status

“While awaiting a response from dispatch, the canine ofﬁcer arrived with

his drug-detection dog,” at

Which point “Trooper Sproat explained

to the canine ofﬁcer

suspected Renteria of drug activity.”

Li The canine ofﬁcer then deployed

alerted to the presence 0f drugs.

On

Li.

why he

his drug dog,

which

appeal, Renteria argued that the conversation between

Trooper Sproat and the canine ofﬁcer regarding suspicions 0f drug activity extended the scope 0f
the stop.

Li. at 549,

“When Trooper
ofﬁcer, he

was

415 P.3d

at 958.

Sproat discussed

still

Why

The Court of Appeals

rejected that argument because,

he suspected Renteria of drug activity With the canine

in his patrol car awaiting a response

from dispatch as

t0 the validity

0f

Renteria’s driving privileges and as to whether there were any outstanding warrants for Renteria
0r his passenger.”

Li.

“Because dispatch

still

had not conﬁrmed Renteria’s valid driving

privileges or responded about Whether Renteria 0r his passenger

the conversation

trafﬁc stop.”

Li.

had any outstanding warrants,

between Trooper Sproat and the canine ofﬁcer did not unlawfully extend the
That

is,

the conversation did not extend the stop because

it

occurred While

Trooper Sproat was waiting for dispatch t0 return information he needed to process a
Exactly the same

is

true here.

Trooper Marrott requested information from dispatch to

process a citation and was waiting for that information
State V. Howell, 159 Idaho 245, 249,

driving status and for warrants

is

citation.

358 P.3d 806, 810

When he conducted
(Ct.

the

App. 2015) (holding

part 0f mission of trafﬁc stop).

dog

sniff.

that a

E

check 0f

Just as Trooper Sproat’s

conversation with the canine ofﬁcer in Renteria could not have extended the stop because the
conversation was complete before dispatch returned the information Trooper Sproat requested,
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the

dog

sniff

performed by Trooper Marrott could not have extended the stop because

complete when

(or, at least, as)

it

was

dispatch returned the information that Trooper Marrott requested.

Dewitt’s argument 0n this point focuses exclusively 0n the fact that Trooper Marrott
believed he had reasonable suspicion t0 deploy his drug dog.

(Appellant’s brief, p.

16.)

According to Dewitt,

The Video shows

clearly that, after discovering the travel time discrepancy,

Ofﬁcer Marrott told dispatch

that

Dewitt was involved in criminal

he had “reasonable suspicion” t0 believe Mr.

activity,

and Ofﬁcer Marrott

car

left his patrol

Mr. Dewitt, telling Mr. Dewitt he was now
being detained due to reasonable suspicion of drug activity. (EX. A, 11:40:40 —

and made the same announcement
11:40:35

to

[sic].)

(Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) According t0 Dewitt, this shows that Trooper Marrott “had explicitly

and unequivocally abandoned the purpose of the trafﬁc

map

stop, right after

search and discovered the discrepancy in the travel times report

Dewitt
drug dog.

is

correct that Trooper Marrott believed he

Of course,

it

m m,

163 Idaho

canine ofﬁcer

why he

he performed the google

by Mr. Dewitt.”

had reasonable suspicion

(Id.)

t0

deploy his

appears that exactly the same was true of Trooper Sproat in Ren_teria.

at

547, 415 P.3d at 956 (noting that Trooper Sproat explained to the

suspected drug activity). There, as here, the ofﬁcer’s subjective belief that

he had reasonable suspicion has nothing

at all to

do With the objective question Whether the

ofﬁcer’s conduct in fact extended (added time t0) the trafﬁc stop.

It is

0f course possible for an

ofﬁcer to both believe that he has reasonable suspicion t0 conduct a dog sniff and to conduct that

dog

sniff in such a

way

absurd t0 suppose that
activity, the

dog

if

that

it

does not extend the length 0f a trafﬁc stop.

It

borders 0n the

Trooper Marrott had not believed he had reasonable suspicion of drug

sniff would not

have extended the length 0f the

he had reasonable suspicion 0f drug

activity,

it

stop; but,

because he did believe

did extend the scope of the stop.
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It is

Trooper

Marrott’s conduct and the circumstances 0f the stop

whether he extended the length 0f the

needed

t0

stop.

itself,

not What he believed, that determine

Here, dispatch had not returned the information he

complete a citation before Trooper Marrott completed the dog sniff and, as a

result, the

trafﬁc stop could not have been completed before he acquired probable cause t0 search Dewitt’s

vehicle.

The dog

sniff therefore did not

add time

whether or not Trooper

to the trafﬁc stop,

Marrott believed he had reasonable suspicion of drug activity.

Dewitt additionally claims that Trooper Marrott “did not wait for dispatch to return
information, nor did he conduct any further tasks related to the trafﬁc Violation.

EX.

A

To

(Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)

11:40:08.)”

Trooper Marrott did not simply

sit

in his patrol car

he requested, but instead conducted a dog

Whether the dog sniff extended the

stop,

sniff,

and wait for dispatch

he

t0 return the information

somehow

0f course

is

and merely noting

sniff rather than simply sitting in his car does not

would not have been any

the extent that Dewitt

that

just claiming that

to return the information

correct.

But the question here

is

Trooper Marrott conducted a dog

advance that inquiry

shorter if Trooper Marrott simply sat in his car

he needed. To the extent that Dewitt

is

(See generally,

is

The

at all.

trafﬁc stop

and waited for dispatch

suggesting that Trooper Marrott

cancelled his request for information from dispatch (Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (“Ofﬁcer

Marrott told dispatch he had ‘reasonable suspicion’ to believe Mr. Dewitt was involved in
criminal activity,

.

.

.

.”)),

that claim is not supported

by

the record.

While the dash-cam Video

reﬂects that Trooper Marrott recited the factors that, he believed, provided reasonable suspicion

for a

dog

sniff,

it

does not appear that he was talking to dispatch but, instead, that he was making

a record on the dash-cam

itself.

(EX. A, 11:36:39

—

11:39:23.)

In addition, dispatch eventually

returned the information requested by Trooper Marrott, Which presumably

happened

if

would not have

Trooper Marrott cancelled his request. (EX. A, 11:46:04 — 11:46: 14.)
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As

to the claim that

trafﬁc Violation,” that claim

Trooper Marrott did not “conduct any further tasks related t0 the
is

both not supported by the record and not relevant.

First, the

record does not reﬂect Whether Trooper Marrott ever issued Dewitt a citation, for instance. But,

more

importantly,

when Trooper Marrott completed

the

dog

sniff just as dispatch returned the

information he needed to issue a citation, he acquired probable cause to detain Dewitt and search

his vehicle as part

of an investigation of a

much more

serious crime,

permitted t0 pursue before 0r instead of completing a trafﬁc citation.

which investigation he was

E

Renteria, 163 Idaho at

550, 415 P.3d at 959 (holding that drug dog’s indication 0n vehicle provided probable cause to
detain driver and search the vehicle,

had not “completed

Which the ofﬁcer was

entitled t0

his investigation into the original purpose

d0 notwithstanding that he

of the trafﬁc stop”).

Having

determined that Dewitt’s vehicle likely contained drugs, Trooper Marrott was not required to
process a trafﬁc citation before investigating.

the length of the stop in this case

is

What

determines Whether the dog sniff extended

Whether Trooper Marrott had the information he needed

complete the trafﬁc stop before he acquired probable cause t0
he issued a citation

The

after acquiring

district court correctly

initiate

a

new

seizure, not

t0

whether

such probable cause.

concluded that the dog sniff conducted by Trooper Marrott did

not extend the scope of the stop because dispatch had not yet returned the information he needed

t0

complete a

4.

citation.

Had Reasonable Suspicion T0 Extend The Trafﬁc Stop
To Deploy A Drug Dog
Trooper Marrott

“The standard of reasonable

articulable suspicion is not a particularly high or onerous

standard t0 meet. The ofﬁcer must simply be acting on
unparticularized suspicion.”

In Order

State V.

more than a mere hunch or inchoate and

Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410, 283 P.3d 722, 727 (2012)
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(internal

“A

quotation marks omitted).

ofﬁcers—can

articulate speciﬁc facts

reasonable suspicion exists

When

the

ofﬁcer—or

which, together with rational inferences from those

reasonably justify a suspicion that criminal activity

is

facts,

occurring.” Li. at 409-10, 283 P.3d at 726-

“[T]he reasonableness 0f the suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality 0f the

27.

circumstances

at the

time of the stop.” Li.

at

410, 283 P.3d

at

727.

may

“[A]n ofﬁcer

take into

account his experience and law enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered.”

I_d.

Reasonable suspicion

amenable

may

arise

to innocent explanation.

from

factors that are both individually

283 P.3d

Li. at 411,

at

and collectively

728 (“the existence of alternative

innocent explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable suspicion”); Grantham, 146 Idaho

at

497, 198 P.3d at 135 (“While each of these reasons alone could appear innocent,

all

of Deputy

Strangio’s observations considered together, and including his training and experience, give rise

t0 reasonable suspicion sufﬁcient t0

expand the scope of the trafﬁc stop”); State

V. Kelley,

160

Idaho 761, 764, 379 P.3d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 2016) (“The Supreme Court has previously held
that otherwise innocent acts,

when considered

together, can be sufﬁciently suspicious so as to

justify an investigative detention”).

Though

the district court relied primarily

extend the length of the stop,

it

0n

its

conclusion that the drug sniff did not

additionally concluded that, even if the stop

was extended,

Trooper Marrott had reasonable suspicion of drug activity sufﬁcient t0 justify the extension.
p.

137 (“Regardless 0f Whether Marrott actually did have reasonable suspicion t0 deploy

d0g]—which
court,

this

Court believes he did—the stop was not prolonged.”).) As noted by the

(R.,

[his

district

the factors contributing t0 Trooper Marrott’s reasonable suspicion 0f drug activity

included:
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Dewitt’s extreme nervousness, pulsing carotid artery, deep breathing in an effort

calm anxiety,

t0

inability t0

answer clearly basic information about his

trip

including destination city and duration, long delays in responses, a single key on

powerful odor suppressant spray, deceptive behavior, absence of any
spare clothing 0r luggage typically present on a multi-day trip, multiple empty

the

key

ring,

energy drinks, and a prescription bottle of amphetamine.
(R., p.

133 n.

3.)

The

district court

was

correct that these

and other factors jointly provided

Trooper Marrott reasonable suspicion sufﬁcient t0 detain Dewitt in order to deploy his drug dog.
First,

Dewitt was exceptionally nervous when he interacted with Trooper Marrott.

Trooper Marrott testiﬁed that Dewitt:

was extremely nervous. His carotid artery was pulsating in his neck. He had just
ﬁnished smoking a cigarette. He — When I pressed him a little bit more asking
where he was coming from, initially he kind of tilted his head back and closed his
eyes and started breathing real heavy, Which I saw as extreme nervousness, that I
don’t typically see With the motoring public,
had.

It

let

was over the top nervousness.

(5/29/18 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 6-16 (paragraph break omitted».

tilted his

alone any other drug arrest I’ve

According

t0

Trooper Marrott, Dewitt,

head back and took deep breaths for approximately ﬁfteen

t0

twenty seconds. (5/29/18

Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-15;

EX. A, 11:32:18 — 11:32:45 (reﬂecting approximately twenty—ﬁve second

delay to respond).)

Dewitt responds primarily by suggesting that nervousness during a trafﬁc stop does not
contribute t0 reasonable suspicion 0f criminal conduct.

Dewitt

is

correct that the typical nervousness

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.)

accompanying a trafﬁc stop

is

signiﬁcance” for purposes of establishing reasonable suspicion precisely because

While

0f “‘limited

it is

typical

(Appellant’s brief, p. 17 (quoting State V. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924, 367 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct.

App. 2016)), non-typical, excessive nervousness does contribute
suspicion,

ﬂ

State V. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 660, 51 P.3d 1112,

t0 a

1116

ﬁnding of reasonable
(Ct.

App. 2002)

(citing

“excessive nervousness” as factor justifying detention); Grantham, 146 Idaho at 497, 198 P.3d at

22

135 (same).

Trooper Marrott testiﬁed that Dewitt exhibited “extreme” and “over the top”

nervousness of a sort that he does not see even with drug

arrests,

much

less in ordinary trafﬁc

stops. (5/29/18 T11, p. 9, Ls. 6-16.)

Dewitt next claims that his extreme nervousness was attributable t0 his prescription

amphetamines and the caffeinated beverages he had been consuming. (Appellant’s
But, during the trafﬁc stop

brief, p. 18.)

Dewitt stated that his amphetamine prescription “doesn’t do

itself,

anything” because he has been “taking

it

for years.”

(EX. A, 11:55:50

—

11:56:07.)

Nor could

Dewitt’s prescription or consumption of caffeinated beverages reasonably explain the extreme

nervousness Trooper Marrott observed.

While Trooper Marrott acknowledged

that Dewitt’s

pulsating carotid artery could possibly be attributable t0 caffeine and prescription amphetamines

(5/29/18 Tr., p. 23, L. 24

— p.

24, L. 18), prescription pills that he

had taken

for years

and caffeine

could not explain requiring ﬁfteen to twenty seconds t0 gather himself, taking deep breaths with
his eyes closed

origin.

and head against the headrest,

Third, even if there were

in order to

answer a simple question regarding his

some innocent explanation

for Dewitt’s extreme nervousness,

“the existence 0f alternative innocent explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable

suspicion.”

My,

153 Idaho

at

41

1,

283 P.3d

at 728.

Second, Dewitt was unable to coherently answer simple questions regarding his

was

including being unable t0 identify the city he

Visiting,

travel,

and the answers he provided were

obviously deceptive. Asked Where he was coming from, Dewitt stated that he had been Visiting
his brother for a couple of days, but could not clearly identify the city

between Twin Plains or Twin
10, L. 10.)

He

Falls.

In addition to ﬁnding

it

he

Visited, “stumb1[ing]

couldn’t really remember.” (5/29/18 Tr., p.

8, L.

9

—

p.

suspicious that Dewitt travelled from Illinois to Idaho t0

spend several days with his brother but did not

know

23

the

name 0f the

city

he was Visiting

(id.),

Trooper Marrott ﬁrst observed Dewitt’s vehicle headed eastbound before Jerome, Idaho,

meaning
8).

that

he entered the

interstate well before

Twin

Falls (7/16/18 Tr., p. 15, L. 17

Dewitt then told Trooper Marrott that his drive time from

but Trooper Marrott veriﬁed that the drive from Dewitt’s

took only twenty—two hours. (7/16/18

Dewitt responds to
the

name of the

which

city to

Tr., p. 18, L.

18

— p.

of this only by claiming

all

Which he claims

t0

home

p. 17, L.

took twenty-eight hours,

in Pekin, Illinois, t0

Twin

Falls

19, L. 14.)

that,

“This type 0f uncertainty [regarding

have driven a long distance t0 stay several days and in

on the part of an

his brother apparently lives]

Illinois

—

out-of-state motorist does not

add

to

any

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 18.) But he does not say Why.

That

sort

0f uncertainty

is

precisely

What one would expect from a driver Who was attempting

conceal the fact that he was making a non-stop, turn—around
recently seen a sign for

“Twin

(5/29/18 Tr., p. 9, L. 17

— p.

he was stopped was for Twin

Falls,”

and attempted

t0

ad

lib

trip

Visiting family for several days

his story, Without addressing in

but not

at all

Illinois to Idaho,

Dewitt would have seen before

what one would expect from a driver who was

from a long distance. Dewitt also ignores the inconsistencies
any way the

fact that

Falls.

Implausible, inconsistent, and

conﬁlsing reports regarding travel plans contribute t0 reasonable suspicion.

159 Idaho 417, 425, 361 P.3d 1280, 1288

(Ct.

App. 2015) (holding

E

State V. Kelley,

that confusing

and suspicious

reports regarding travel contributed t0 reasonable suspicion); United States V. Contreras,

Cir.

in

Dewitt was ﬁrst seen by Trooper Marrott

west of Jerome, travelling eastbound, well before Twin

F.3d 1031, 1036 (10th

had

a story regarding travel t0 that city

10, L. 10 (noting that the “last sign”

Falls)),

from

t0

506

2007) (“We have noted numerous times that implausible travel plans

can form a basis for reasonable suspicion.”).
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was only one key 0n

Third, Trooper Marrott noticed that there

the key ring for the vehicle

driven by Dewitt. (5/29/18 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 11-21.) In his training and experience, that

drug trafﬁcking, as the vehicle

Dewitt

is

is

correct that this factor

used exclusively for the purpose 0f trafﬁcking.

is

is

(Id.)

Though

consistent with innocent conduct (Appellant’s brief, p. 18),

E

nevertheless contributes to reasonable suspicion in the totality of the circumstances.

States V.

typical of

Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 129 (4th

Cir.

it

M

2010) (single key in ignition contributed t0

reasonable suspicion that driver was acting as a drug courier); United States V. Barns, 858 F.3d
937, 944 (5th Cir. 2017) (ﬁnding reasonable suspicion where ofﬁcer “observed that (1)
[defendant’s] hands were shaking and he appeared nervous; (2) there

ignition; (3) there

were energy drinks

in the vehicle;

and

was a

key

single

in the

(4) the driver’s—side rear quarter panel

appeared to have been tampered with”).
Fourth, Trooper Marrott observed only one dirty change of clothes and n0 luggage in the

vehicle. In his experience, that observation is associated With a quick, turn-around trip of the sort

taken by drug trafﬁckers, and not with the Visit with family over several days reported by Dewitt.

E

(5/29/18 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 14-18; 7/16/18 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 5-11.)

United States

V.

Arango, 912

F.2d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing absence 0f luggage in vehicle despite report of having
taken a long

trip as contributing to

reasonable suspicion); United States

V.

Lawson, 731

F.

App’x

663, 664 (9th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (same).

Fifth,

training

t0

mask

Trooper Marrott observed a can 0f Ozium

and experience,

is

“an extremely strong

the odor 0f marijuana.”

air freshener

(7/16/18 Tr., p. 17, L. 21

(Ct.

25

that, in his

used and associated with marijuana

—

p. 18, L. 1.)

odors in a vehicle contribute to reasonable suspicion 0f drug activity.

136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709

product

air freshener, a

App. 2001)

(citing

Measures

E

State V.

effort to

t0 conceal

Brumﬁeld,

mask odors

as

contributing to reasonable suspicion); United States V. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir.

Goss, 256 F. App’x 122, 124 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished)

2004) (same); United States

V.

(same); State V. Franzen, 792

N.W.2d

CV-1420-AKK-TMP, 2015
Ozium

air freshener as factor

Sixth, Dewitt’s

his

WL

533, 537

5178817,

at

(ND. 2010)

*4 (N.D. Ala. Sept.

When

demeanor changed When he was asked about the presence of marijuana

(5/29/18 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 7-22.)

turned his head, looked

Idaho

Tr., p. 12, Ls. 7-22;

away from [Trooper

When

0f

in

EX. A, 11:33:32

asked about marijuana, “he kind 0f

Marrott] and gave a

much

quieter denial of that.”

A change of demeanor of that sort contributes t0 reasonable suspicion.
at

(citing presence

asked about methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin, he gave “a distinct ‘No’

for each 0f those.”

(Id.)

2015)

Trooper Marrott asked Dewitt individually Whether his vehicle contained

vehicle.

11:33:43.)

4,

supporting trafﬁcking marijuana).

methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. (5/29/18

—

(same); Smith V. Gordy, No. 7:14-

497, 198 P.3d at 135 (holding that

When

E

Grantham, 146

defendant’s “demeanor changed visibly

When

asked whether there was methamphetamine in the car as compared to other drugs,” that fact
contributed t0 reasonable suspicion).

Finally,

Trooper Marrott observed multiple, empty energy drink

bottles, as well as a

prescription bottle of amphetamine, both of which Trooper Marrott testiﬁed were frequently used

by trafﬁckers

to stay

awake on long

trips.

(5/29/18 Tr., p. 11, L. 22

This further contributed t0 reasonable suspicion.

E m,

— p.

12, L. 6; p. 36, Ls. 2-9.)

858 F.3d

presence of energy drinks contributed to reasonable suspicion); State

V.

at

944 (holding

that

Adan, 886 N.W.2d 841,

847 (N.D. 2016) (same).

While

it

might be that none of these factors by

to extend the stop

itself

and investigate the possibility of drug
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would provide reasonable suspicion

activity, the district court

was

correct to

hold that collectively, and in light of Trooper Marrott’s training and experience, they provided
reasonable suspicion sufﬁcient t0 justify the brief detention to deploy his drug dog.

The

D.

District Court’s Determination

T0 Counsel

A
t0

Is

Supported

That Dewitt Did Not Unequivocallv Invoke His Right

BV The Record

suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and

have counsel present during interrogation. Miranda

“An

individual’s right t0 cut off questioning

‘scrupulously honored.”’

State V.

is

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).

V.

grounded in the Fifth Amendment and must be

Law, 136 Idaho 721, 724, 39 P.3d 661, 664

(quoting Michigan V. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975)).

(1994).

724, 39 P.3d at 664.

at

E

App. 2002)

However, “police ofﬁcers are not

required t0 cease questioning unless the invocation 0f Miranda rights

Law, 136 Idaho

(Ct.

is

clear

also Davis V. United States,

and unequivocal.”

512 U.S. 452, 459-60

Speciﬁcally, With respect to the invocation of the right t0 counsel, the United States

Supreme Court,

in Davis, held:

must unambiguously request counsel
[A suspect] must articulate
have counsel present sufﬁciently clearly that a reasonable police
ofﬁcer in the circumstances would understand the statement t0 be a request for an
attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level 0f clarity, Edwards [v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)] does not require that the ofﬁcers stop questioning
the suspect

.

.

.

.

his desire t0

the suspect.

Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.

“If a reference regarding a desire for an attorney’s assistance

ambiguous 0r equivocal so

that a reasonable ofﬁcer, in light

of the circumstances, would have

understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, the ofﬁcer
t0 stop questioning the suspect.”

App. 2017).

State V. Davis, 162 Idaho 874, 876,

Whether a suspect has unequivocally invoked

objectively, based

0n the

totality

0f the circumstances. State

27

is

V.

his

is

not required

406 P.3d 886, 888

Miranda

(Ct.

rights is evaluated

Whipple, 134 Idaho 498, 503-04,

5 P.3d 478, 483-84 (Ct.

district court

ﬁnding

App. 2000) (ﬁnding substantial and competent evidence

that defendant did not unequivocally

t0 support

and unambiguously invoke the

right to

counsel under the totality 0f the circumstances).

Dewitt did not unequivocally and unambiguously request counsel. After Trooper Marrott

m

discovered the roughly nineteen pounds of marijuana in Dewitt’s trunk, Dewitt was placed under

arrest,

TL,

he was read his

rights,

EX. A, 11:47:24 — 11:48:00.)

p. 24, Ls. 9-20;

not believe Dewitt was coming from

Idaho.

and he acknowledged

(EX. A, 11:48:25

—

Twin

11:48:56.)

He

Falls

work and

and then

talk.”

said,

(EX. A, 11:48:58

“Um

.

.

.

Without

—

he understood them. (7/16/18

Trooper Marrott then made clear that he did

and did not believe the marijuana was secured in

then suggested that if Dewitt was truthful and honest

with him regarding where Dewitt secured the marijuana,
to

that

“We

can help you

out, if you’re Willing

11:49:46.) Dewitt paused for approximately ten seconds,

my lawyer

.”
.

.

(EX. A, 11:49:46

.

Dewitt, he also “shook his head side-to-side” as he

made

—

11:49:58.) According t0

this statement (Appellant’s brief, p. 20),

but Trooper Marrott did not testify that he did (7/16/18 Tr., p. 24, L. 21

—

p. 25, L. 9),

and the

Video does not clearly show that he did (EX. A, 11:49:46 — 11:49:58). Trooper Marrott testiﬁed
that

he understood Dewitt’s response as indicating that “potentially he wanted to not answer

questions without an attorney, but

want

to say anything Without

Tr., p. 24, L.

21

—

it

wasn’t a strong declaration.

an attorney present.

p. 25, L. 9.)

I

It

wasn’t him saying,

don’t want t0 answer questions.’”

‘I

don’t

(7/16/18

Trooper Marrott paused in asking any questions, but asked

additional questions approximately a minute later.

(7/16/18 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 10-24; EX. A, 11:49-

58 — 11:50:40.)

Even assuming

that

unambiguously invoke his

Dewitt did shake his head

right to

an attorney.

slightly,

he did not unequivocally and

In the ﬁrst place, as the district court correctly
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concluded,

it

was “unclear

if

Dewitt was merely thinking-out-loud, contemplating his options,

asking himself rhetorically, or otherwise making a request for counsel.”
Dewitt’s utterance—“Um

.

.

.

without

my

attorney

.

.

.

.”—immediately followed Trooper

Marrott’s suggestion that he might be able to help Dewitt if Dewitt

regarding his source for the marijuana.

(EX. A,

Second,

(R., p. 145.)

11:48:25

—

would provide

details

Trooper Marrott

11:49:58.)

subsequently asked other questions about, for instance, the quantity of drugs Dewitt was

transporting,

how much he

paid for the drugs, and

which questions Dewitt answered without

how much

hesitation.

the drugs are sold for in Illinois,

(EX. A, 11:50:40

—

This

11:51:50.)

suggests that even if Dewitt expressed an unwillingness t0 provide details about his source for

the drugs, he

was

Willing to provide other information.

For both reasons, Dewitt’s

statement

E

invocation of his right t0 counsel.

State V.

was not an unambiguous and unequivocal
Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 525, 50 P.3d 1014, 1020

(2002) (holding that mother 0f minor defendant did not clearly invoke defendant’s right t0
counsel by stating “[t]he Miranda rights state that he has a right to one” (internal quotation marks

omitted»; State

V.

Page, 146 Idaho

548, 559, 199 P.3d 123, 134 (2008) (“I don’t think

answer that” was not an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of the right
(internal quotation

(Ct.

marks omitted));

marks omitted);

App. 2008) (defendant’s statement

should

remain

silent

State V. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 536-37, 37 P.3d 625, 627-28

App. 2001) (“I’ve got an attorney” was not unambiguous invocation 0f

(internal quotation

to

I

right t0 counsel)

State V. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 386, 179 P.3d 346,

that

349

(Ct.

he would “rather wait” t0 talk t0 police and he “thinks he

needs advice” did not constitute unambiguous invocation 0f right to counsel (internal quotation

marks omitted»; Wenzel

V. Early,

Cal. Mar. 3, 2006) (holding that

N0. O3CV606-BEN (JMA), 2006

where defendant shook

29

his

WL 8439845,

head when asked

if he

at

*15 (S.D.

wanted

to talk,

doing so did not constitute unequivocal invocation of right to remain

739 (9th

silent),

ﬂ

226

F.

App’x

Cir. 2007).

But, even if this Court determines that Dewitt unequivocally and unambiguously invoked

his right to counsel, that conclusion

is

irrelevant t0 the admissibility 0f all

evidence—both

physical and pre-custodial statements—acquired prior to the invocation of his right to counsel.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment 0f the

district court.

DATED this 23rd day 0f August, 2019.
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Andrew V. Wake
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Deputy Attorney General
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